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Abstract
We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. The
novelty is that we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device, where each player
does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset
of his strategy set that he submits to the matching device. The matching device
is a very simple one. It only selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly
some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it
does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. Using the concepts of perfect
Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, we show that players
coordinate directly on the Pareto optimal outcome. This implies that they neither use
the option of fuzzy play, nor make use of the matching device.
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1 Introduction
There is a widespread interest in coordination games with multiple Pareto-ranked equi-
libria, since these games have many equilibria that are bad for all concerned, but still
are diÆcult to rule out by standard notions of rationality. The coordination game is of
particular importance for macroeconomists, who believe that an economy may be become
mired in a low-output equilibrium, see e.g. Bryant [2], Cooper [4], and Cooper and John
[6]. Indeed, while all agents in the economy understand that the outcome is ineÆcient,
each agent, acting indepently, is powerless to coordinate the activities of other agents to
reach a Pareto-preferred equilibrium. So, from this perspective, a depression in aggregate
economic activity arises when the economy falls into the trap of a low activity level Nash
equilibrium.
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Figure 1: A 2 2 coordination game
Consider a 2  2 coordination game between two players. The payo matrix is given
in Figure 1. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this simultaneous move game,
the strategy proles (a; a) and (b; b), as well as a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each
player selects the action a with probability
1
3
. These are Nash equilibria because each
player is acting optimally given the choice of the other. The equilibria of this coordination
game are strict Nash equilibria. Consequently, the strategy prole (b; b) also satises the
conditions imposed by the most rened equilibriumnotions such as strategic stability in the
sense of Kohlberg and Mertens [12]. The multiplicity of equilibria, and thus the possibility
of a Pareto-inferior equilibrium, derives from players' inability to coordinate their choices
in this strategic environment. As a consequence, realized equilibrium outcomes that are
Pareto-suboptimal relative to other equilibria are often termed coordination failures.
One conclusion of a fair amount of experimental evidence is that coordination problems
are not a pure theoretical curiosity. In particular, coordination failures are routinely
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observed in experimental games, see e.g. Cooper et al. [5], and Ochs [13].
Complementary to the accumulation of evidence on coordination games has been the
development of theories concerning equilibrium selection in these games. Harsanyi and
Selten [9] have proposed the risk dominance principle. This principle models that the play
of certain equilibrium strategies is riskier than the play of others given the underlying
strategic uncertainty of a game. Carlsson and van Damme [3] have provided an argument
for selection of an equilibrium in a coordination game. Their idea is to explore the equi-
libria of a nearby game of incomplete information. The equilibrium for the coordination
game is then the limit of the equilibrium for the nearby game as the amount of incomplete
information goes to zero. They nd that in the limit it is the risk-dominant equilibrium
that is selected. Another approach to equilibrium selection involves exploring the dynam-
ics of coordination games. This approach requires the specication of a dynamic process
describing the play of agents involved in such a game, see e.g. Kandori et al. [11]. An-
other part of the literature has looked for possible remedies to coordination problems like
preplay communication or cheap talk (see Farrel [7], [8] and Rabin [15]).
This paper considers a novel and simple way to resolve coordination problems, which
consists of the combination of fuzzy play and the introduction of a matching device. By
fuzzy play we mean that each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but
instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to a matching
device. The matching device is a very simple one. It only selects a match if possible,
and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player
otherwise. That is, it does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. We focus
on pure n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria.
For the 2  2 coordination game represented in Figure 1, players now have to choose
between sending to the matching device either only the action a, or only the action b, or
both actions a and b. The matching device selects a match if possible, it selects randomly
some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, if
both players send both actions a and b to the device, then the pair (a; a) is selected with
probability  2 (0; 1) and the pair (b; b) is selected with probability 1   . If one player
sends only the action a, while the other player sends both actions a and b, then the device
selects the pair (a; a) with probability one; and so on. Payos of this new game are given
in Figure 2 with x = 1 + .
Using the concepts of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect ratio-
nalizability, we show that players coordinate directly on the best match possible. They
do not use the option of fuzzy play, but submit a single strategy to the matching device.
This strategy is the one corresponding to the Pareto optimal outcome.
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Figure 2: Fuzzy play in the 2 2 coordination game
The concept of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability reverts to the iterative elimi-
nation of weakly dominated strategies for the class of two-player normal-form games. Let
us apply this well-known concept to our example. Obviously, the strategy which consists
of sending only the action b to the device is weakly dominated by the strategy where both
actions a and b are sent. At the rst round of the iterative procedure we eliminate the
strategy which consists of sending only the action b. At the second round, the strategy
where both actions are sent is now weakly dominated by the strategy which consists of
sending only the action a. So, the unique trembling-hand perfect rationalizable solution
is the one where both players choose to send only the Pareto-optimal action a.
2 Fuzzy play and the matching device
We consider an n-player pure coordination game denoted by G =


N; fA
i
g
i2N
; fu
i
g
i2N

;
where N = f1; : : : ; ng is the set of players, A
i
is the nite set of actions or pure strategies
of player i, and u
i
is player i's payo function. A game is a coordination game if the
players have the same number m of strategies, which are indexed so that it is always a
strict Nash equilibrium for both players to play strategies having the same index. Without
loss of generality, we may assume that the sets of pure strategies of all players coincide,
A
1
=    = A
n
; which makes it meaningful to take intersections of such sets.
A pure coordination game is a coordination game for which the payos o the diagonal
are zero. In the game G we have that strict Nash equilibria are on the diagonal, and outside
the diagonal the payos are zero for both players. Finally, we impose that the strict Nash
equilibria are Pareto ranked, without loss of generality decreasing in the index of the
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strategy. Summarizing,
u
i
(a
1
1
; : : : ; a
n
1
) >    > u
i
(a
1
m
; : : : ; a
n
m
) > 0; i 2 N;
u
i
(a
1
k
1
; : : : ; a
n
k
n
) = 0; k
i
0
6= k
i
00
for some i
0
; i
00
2 N:
We introduce both fuzzy play and a matching device. By fuzzy play we mean that a
player does not necessarily restrict himself to play a single pure strategy a
i
k
; but instead
chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set A
i
that he submits to the matching device.
He thereby rules out that strategies outside A
i
are played. As a consequence, the set of
strategies of each player becomes
S
i
=
n
s
i



; 6= s
i
 A
i
o
, i 2 N .
The matching device is assumed to operate as follows. It randomly selects a match if
possible, and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each
player otherwise. That is, the matching device does not impose that the best alternatives
are matched.
Let (a
i
k
) denote the prior probability that the matching device selects the strategy
a
i
k
2 A
i
, i 2 N . It is assumed that (a
i
k
) > 0 for all k,
P
a
i
k
2A
i
(a
i
k
) = 1, and (a
1
k
) =
   = (a
n
k
) = 
k
; k = 1; :::;m.
Suppose player i submits the set of actions s
i
2 S
i
to the matching device. Two
cases have to be distinguished. Either the players' action sets have one or more actions
in common, or they have nothing in common. That is, either there is k such that for
all i 2 N; a
i
k
2 s
i
; or there is no k such that for all i 2 N; a
i
k
2 s
i
; so \
i2N
s
i
= ;: If
\
i2N
s
i
= ;; then a
i
k
2 s
i
is chosen with probability

k
P
a
i
l
2s
i

l
; i 2 N:
If \
i2N
s
i
6= ; and a
k
2 \
i2N
s
i
, then a
k
is chosen with probability

k
P
a
l
2\
i2N
s
i

l
:
The way the matching device selects strategies is assumed to be common knowledge among
all players.
We can express the payos of the induced game as follows:
U
i
(s
1
; : : : ; s
n
) =
8
>
<
>
:
0 if \
i2N
s
i
= ;,
P
a
k
2\
i2N
s
i

k
u
i
(a
1
k
;:::;a
n
k
)
P
a
k
2\
i2N
s
i

k
otherwise.
We denote the induced game by G =


N; fS
i
g
i2N
; fU
i
g
i2N

. The concepts we will use to
analyze G are perfect Nash equilibrium and trembling-hand perfect rationalizability.
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3 Perfect Nash equilibrium
Three equivalent denitions of perfect Nash equilibrium have been proposed in the liter-
ature. One of them has been introduced by Selten [16] and is the following. A perfect
Nash equilibrium is a limit point of a sequence of completely mixed strategy proles with
the property that it is a best reply against every element in the sequence. As general
notation, we denote by  (X) the set of all Borel probability measures on X: For nite X;
we denote by 
0
(X) the set of all Borel probability measures giving positive probability to
each member of X. Given c
i
2 (S
i
), we denote by c
i
(s
i
) the probability that c
i
assigns
to the subset of pure strategies s
i
: Perfect Nash equilibrium for the game G is dened
formally as follows.
Denition 1 A perfect Nash equilibrium of the game G is a mixed strategy prole c 2
Q
i2N

 
S
i

with the property that there exists a sequence (c
n
)
1
n=0
of completely mixed
strategy proles that converges to c such that for each player i the strategy c
i
is a best
response to c
 i
n
for all values of n.
We say that a player's strategy is weakly dominated if the player has another strategy
at least as good no matter what the other players do and better for at least some strategy
prole of the other players. To characterize the perfect Nash equilibria of the game G; the
following two lemmas are very useful.
Lemma 1 If a strategy prole is a perfect Nash equilibrium of G; then the strategy of
neither player is weakly dominated.
Lemma 2 The game G possesses at least one trembling hand perfect equilibrium.
The proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 can be found in van Damme [17, p.49] and in
Selten [16, p.48], respectively. Before characterizing the perfect Nash equilibria, we rst
examine the set of all Nash equilibria of the game G.
Theorem 1 The strategy prole s = (s
1
; : : : ; s
n
) 2 S is a pure Nash equilibrium of G if
and only if for all i 2 N; u
i
(a
1
k

; : : : ; a
n
k

)  U
i
(s); where k

= minfk j a
k
2 \
j2Nnfig
s
j
g
and u
i
(a
k

) = 0 if \
j2Nnfig
s
j
= ;:
Proof. Consider a strategy prole s 2 S: Player i does not deviate if and only if for all
a
k
2 \
j2Nnfig
s
j
it holds that u
i
(a
1
k
; : : : ; a
n
k
)  U
i
(s): This observation leads immediately
to the result.
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From Theorem 1 we derive that the Nash equilibria in symmetric pure strategies of
the game G coincide with the Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the game G. Symmetry
implies s
1
=    = s
n
: Next, from our characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria of
G one may immediately infer that s
i
; i 2 N; is a singleton. Moreover, each strategy combi-
nation (fa
1
k
g; : : : ; fa
n
k
g) is a Nash equilibrium of G: Obviously, each strategy combination
(a
1
k
; : : : ; a
n
k
) is a Nash equilibrium of G. We have shown the following result.
Corollary 1 The symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game G are (fa
k
g; : : : ; fa
k
g),
k = 1; ::;m, and coincide with the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game G; given by
(a
k
; : : : ; a
k
), k = 1; ::;m.
We turn next to the characterization of perfect Nash equilibria.
Theorem 2 If the strategy prole (s
1
; : : : ; s
n
) is a perfect Nash equilibrium of G; then
\
i2N
s
i
= fa
1
g:
Proof. Consider any s
i
such that a
i
1
=2 s
i
: We show that s
i
is weakly dominated by
s
i
[ fa
i
1
g. First, against s
 i
such that a
1
2 \
j2Nnfig
s
j
; we have
U
i
(s
i
[ fa
i
1
g; s
 i
) =
X
a
k
2\
j2N
s
j

k

1
+
P
a
l
2\
j2N
s
j

l
 u
i
(a
1
k
; : : : ; a
n
k
) +

1

1
+
P
a
l
2\
j2N
s
j

l
 u
i
(a
1
1
; : : : ; a
n
1
)
>
X
a
k
2\
j2N
s
j

k
P
a
l
2\
j2N
s
j

l
 u
i
(a
1
k
; : : : ; a
n
k
)
= U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
):
Second, against s
 i
such that a
1
=2 \
j2Nnfig
s
j
; we have
U
i
(s
i
[ fa
i
1
g; s
 i
) = U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
) =
X
a
k
2\
j2N
s
j

k
P
a
l
2\
j2N
s
j

l
 u
i
(a
1
k
; : : : ; a
n
k
).
Using Lemma 1 and knowing that every strategy s
i
which does not contain a
i
1
is weakly
dominated by s
i
[fa
i
1
g, it follows that no perfect Nash equilibrium puts positive weight on
such a strategy s
i
. Using our characterization of Nash equilibria in Theorem 1, it follows
that the strategy (s
1
; : : : ; s
n
) 2 S is a perfect Nash equilibrium only if \
i2N
s
i
= fa
1
g:
Corollary 2 The unique symmetric perfect Nash equilibrium of G is (fa
1
1
g; : : : ; fa
n
1
g).
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4 Trembling-hand perfect rationalizability
In the same way as rationalizability (Bernheim [1], Pearce [14]) is related to Nash equi-
librium, the concept of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability due to Herings and Van-
netelbosch [10] is related to perfect Nash equilibrium. Instead of using best responses as in
rationalizability, the players are required to use cautious best responses in trembling-hand
perfect rationalizability.
Another motivation which leads to the trembling-hand perfect rationalizability concept
is obtained by carrying the logic behind cautious rationalizability (due to Pearce [14]) one
step further. This implies that one wants to consider a solution concept where players
eliminate responses that are not cautious in each round. All pure strategies that haven't
been deleted yet are considered as possible by the players, and therefore they do not use
conjectures that put probability zero on some of these strategies. Trembling-hand perfect
rationalizability (THPR) is dened by the following iterative procedure.
Denition 2 Let T
0
=
Q
i2N
(S
i
): For k  1; T
k
=
Q
i2N
T
i
k
is inductively dened as
follows: c
i
belongs to T
i
k
if c
i
2 T
i
k 1
and there is c
 i
2 int(ch(T
 i
k 1
)) such that c
i
is a best
response against c
 i
within T
i
k 1
: The set T
1
= lim
k!1
T
k
is the set of trembling-hand
perfect rationalizable strategy proles of the game G.
At each step of the iteration, a strategy c
i
of player i has to be a best response against
some conjecture c
 i
2 int(ch(T
 i
k 1
)); the relative interior of the convex hull of the set
T
 i
k 1
: Such a conjecture is called a cautious conjecture. It follows that at each step of
the iteration at least all weakly dominated strategies are deleted. The set of trembling-
hand perfect rationalizable strategy proles is shown to be non-empty in Herings and
Vannetelbosch [10].
Theorem 3 The set of trembling-hand perfect rationalizable strategy proles of the game
G is non-empty.
Lemma 3 claims that any strategy which excludes the action a
i
1
is never a cautious best
response, and can therefore not belong to T
i
1
. In other words, it is never a best response
for player i to send a subset of actions to the matching device which does not contain the
Pareto one, a
i
1
. Moreover, one can show that submitting any strategy to the matching
device that contains the Pareto action a
i
1
is individually rational.
Lemma 3 It holds that s
i
=2 T
i
1
if and only if a
i
1
=2 s
i
.
Proof. We show rst that s
i
=2 T
i
1
if a
i
1
=2 s
i
. Consider any s
i
such that a
i
1
=2 s
i
. It follows
as in the proof of Theorem 2 that s
i
is weakly dominated by s
i
[ fa
i
1
g.
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We show next that s
i
2 T
i
1
if a
i
1
2 s
i
. We observe rst that if s
i
is the unique best
response against a conjecture c
 i
(possibly degenerate), then it is also the unique best
response against some cautious conjecture. More precisely, take any s
i
2 S
i
. If there exists
c
 i
such (i) c
 i
2 (S
 i
) and (ii) for all s
i
2 S
i
, s
i
6= s
i
, U
i
(s
i
; c
 i
) > U
i
(s
i
; c
 i
), then,
using a continuity argument, it follows that there exists
b
c
 i
such that (iii)
b
c
 i
2 
0
(S
 i
)
and (iv) for all s
i
2 S
i
, s
i
6= s
i
, U
i
(s
i
;
b
c
 i
) > U
i
(s
i
;
b
c
 i
).
Consider any s
i
such that a
i
1
2 s
i
: For j 6= i; let c
j
be a non-degenerate probability
distribution on fa
j
k
g; for a
i
k
2 s
i
; and fa
j
1
; a
j
k
g; for a
i
k
=2 s
i
: When all players j play accord-
ing to c
j
; then there is only positive probability on intersections \
j2Nnfig
s
j
of the form
;; a
k
for a
i
k
2 s
i
; or fa
1
; a
k
g for a
k
=2 s
i
: Notice that the play of s
i
results in the highest
payo possible, irrespective of the \
j2Nnfig
s
j
that results from the play of i's opponents.
The play of any proper subset of s
i
results in a strictly lower payo when matched against
fa
k
g for some a
i
k
2 s
i
not in the proper subset. The play of a set of actions that contains
an action a
k
not in s
i
results in a strictly lower payo when matched against fa
1
; a
k
g: It
follows that s
i
is the unique best response against the conjecture c
 i
; and by the argument
given above, it is the unique best response against some cautious conjecture. It follows
that s
i
2 T
i
1
:
We can use Lemma 3 to show the following main result.
Theorem 4 It holds that T
i
2
= T
i
1
= ffa
i
1
gg; i 2 N:
Proof. From Lemma 3 we know that any s
j
2 T
j
1
contains the action a
j
1
: Then, irre-
spective of the choice of s
j
2 T
j
1
; j 2 N n fig; the play of s
i
= fa
i
1
g gives to player i
a utility U
i
(fa
i
1
g; s
 i
) = u
i
(a
1
1
; :::; a
n
1
). Consider any s
i
2 T
i
1
such that s
i
6= fa
i
1
g. Ob-
viously, U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
)  u
i
(a
1
1
; :::; a
n
1
); for all s
 i
2
Q
j2Nnfig
T
j
1
: If s
j
= s
i
; j 2 N n fig;
then U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
) < u
i
(a
1
1
; :::; a
n
1
): It follows that for any conjecture c
 i
2 int(ch(T
 i
1
));
U
i
(s
i
; c
 i
) < u
i
(a
1
1
; :::; a
n
1
): We have shown that T
i
2
= ffa
i
1
gg: It follows immediately from
Theorem 3 that T
i
1
= ffa
i
1
gg:
To illustrate our results we consider the 3  3 pure coordination game depicted in
Figure 3. Once we introduce fuzzy play and the simple matching device, we obtain a new
game whose matrix payos are given by Figure 4 where 3 > x > 2, 2 > y > 1, 3 > z > 1,
3 > w > 1 and w > y. Obviously, the strategies of player i that do not include the action
a
1
are weakly dominated, and hence do not belong to T
i
1
. Indeed, the strategies fa
2
g, fa
3
g,
fa
2
; a
3
g are weakly dominated (and are never cautious best responses) by the strategies
fa
1
; a
2
g, fa
1
; a
3
g, fa
1
; a
2
; a
3
g. At the rst round we eliminate all the strategies that do
not include the action a
1
. At the second round, both players know that their opponent
8
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a
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Figure 3: A 3 3 coordination game
will never use such strategies. Since both players are cautious, their conjectures have to
give positive weight to fa
1
g, fa
1
; a
2
g, fa
1
; a
3
g and fa
1
; a
2
; a
3
g of their opponent. As a
consequence each player has a unique cautious best response, which is the strategy fa
1
g.
Indeed, this strategy will guarantee a payo of 3 while any other strategy gives a payo of
at most 3 and a payo strictly less than 3 against some strategies within the support of the
conjecture. So, each player has a unique trembling-hand perfect rationalizable strategy,
which consists of sending only the action a
1
to the device and which allows the players to
coordinate perfectly on the Pareto-optimal outcome.
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a
1
1
a
1
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a
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a
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1
2
; a
1
3
a
1
1
; a
1
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a
1
1
; a
1
2
; a
1
3
a
2
1
a
2
2
a
2
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1
; a
2
2
a
2
2
; a
2
3
a
2
1
; a
2
3
a
2
1
; a
2
2
; a
2
3
Figure 4: Fuzzy play in the 3 3 coordination game
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5 Conclusion
We have revisited n-player pure coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria.
The novelties that we have introduced are fuzzy play and a matching device. Each player
does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of
his strategy set that he submits to the matching device. The matching device we have
considered is a very simple one. It only selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly
some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it
does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. We have applied the concepts of
perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability to the resulting
situation. It has been shown that all players coordinate directly on the Pareto optimal
outcome. As a consequence, the players do neither use the possibility of fuzzy play, nor
do they use the matching device. Both concepts lead to the conclusion that the mere
possibility of fuzzy play and the mere availability of a simple matching device is suÆcient
for direct coordination on the Pareto optimal outcome.
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